MR. THAYER: For the record my name is Jay
Thayer. I'm the Vice President of Operations for Entergy
Nuclear. You've asked me here today to summarize
discussion of decommissioning of Entergy Nuclear Vermont
Yankee.

Just to be upfront Entergy Vermont Yankee opposes the bill before this Committee. Entergy VY's committed to Vermont and to continuing to provide low cost base load energy to Vermont and the region to 2012 and beyond. This bill, however, is unnecessary and will create a financial burden on Entergy VY that could well require it to shut down -- the plant to shut down before 2012.

In addition, the bill would alter the agreement reached with and their Certificate of Public Good issued by the State of Vermont in 2002 when Entergy VY purchased the VY station.

First, I would like to give you some background on federal regulations as they pertain to decommissioning and then I'll talk specifically about this bill and then I'll summarize for you. Thank you.

For some background NRC federal regulations provide five significant points related to decommissioning of a nuclear power plant. These are captured in federal law. I'll give you these citations after I finish up, but

I pulled these out because I think it's important to understand how far the federal government goes in codifying the decommissioning requirements for the hundred or so nuclear plants that operate in 39 states in the United States.

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First point. Each power radioactive licensee is required to provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that funds will be available for the decommissioning process. It's pretty general, but it is pretty clear also. NRC requires that each licensee provide certification that a calculated minimum amount is available to be used for decommissioning. This is required every two years, and in fact every year when a plant is within five years of its license expiring like Vermont Yankee is. That's a point I wanted to make. Each and every year now Vermont Yankee has to certify to the NRC that we have the funds available to be used for decommissioning and it's calculated against a minimum There's a formula to calculate this minimum amount and the NRC wants to make sure each licensee has access to at least that amount.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Can I ask a question? (Inaudible)

MR. THAYER: A third point at least this minimum amount must be funded by one of several mechanisms

including quote unquote an external sinking fund segregated and outside of the control of the licensee. This is also important because when we talk about these funds and where they are the idea of a decommissioning trust fund, the idea that I wanted to leave you with here is that the decommissioning trust fund is very separate from the company, the company's operations, other sources for the company. By federal law it is very well segregated and managed and directed by people other than the company. It's very much isolated from day-to-day business operations of the company.

At or about the five-year period, five-year point prior to the projected end of operation licensees must submit a preliminary cost estimate for the cost to decommission the plant and that's a requirement.

Now in the State of Vermont in the dry fuel storage docket that happened back in 2005 the Public Service Board also said they wanted to see that detailed decommissioning cost estimate and that was submitted I believe it was the beginning of 2007. I can provide the Committee with a copy of that estimate if you would like. It's a pretty thick document, but it goes through kind of the industry standard for a complete decommissioning cost estimate because the NRC wants to make sure that the company understand how much it's going to take to

decommission the plant. That has been done. That document was provided to House Natural Resources and I would be happy to provide that to this Committee as well.

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The last point in federal regulations I would like to make is licensees must submit five years before the expiration of their operating license a spent fuel management and funding program. That's also been done by the company because there is -- this wasn't originally contemplated by NRC decommissioning rules, but since the Department of Energy has not delivered on their contracted commitment to remove spent fuel from nuclear plants we've had some nuclear plants shut down now and still have fuel on site with no projected or no firm date for when the Department of Energy is going to deliver on its contracted commitment. That question has gone to court. It's been argued up through the court system right up to the court of appeals at the federal level, and it's been decided by the courts that the Department of Energy is indeed responsible for the full cost of spent fuel storage management because they did not deliver on the contract to start removing fuel from the nuclear plant sites in January of 1998. So that's been decided in court.

Now the reason I emphasize that point when we went through the case with the Public Service Board in 2005 on dry fuel storage, who is responsible and how were

the costs being collected, that point was not quite as clear as it is today. Today the courts have decided there's plenty of precedent. The Department of Energy has started paying some companies damage claims for their cost of storing fuel. So the point I want to make here is during the remaining operation of Vermont Yankee for however long that may be we are -- I fully intend to recover the cost of fuel storage from the Department of Energy because they failed to perform.

After the plant shuts down, whenever that may be, we also fully intend to collect those costs from the Department of Energy. So those costs will not be taken from -- will not be removed from the decommissioning fund. Okay. That's a point that's been in some question over the last few weeks.

In summary, I would like to make it perfectly clear to your Committee, as I have others, Entergy Vermont Yankee has been and will continue to be responsible for the cost of decommissioning the VY plant. The NRC will make sure of this. It is clear under federal law and we will certainly do what is required by NRC and federal law. Thus, this bill is not necessary to ensure that the VY station is safely and completely decommissioned.

Now I want to remind people of some of the discussions at the state level about decommissioning that

happened back at the sale in 2002. The Public Service
Board was very explicit on this issue and they stated
during the sale that the sale of Vermont Yankee to Entergy
would relieve Vermont ratepayers from the financial risks
associated with decommissioning. The Board order states,
and I quote, increases in contributions needed to ensure
decommissioning upon shut down will not be passed on to
Vermont consumers. That's a direct quote right out of the
order.

Another quote that I would like you to listen to is they also stated, and I quote, the ENVY will demonstrate that it possesses funding sufficient to accomplish decommissioning and furthermore to complete site restoration, which I'll talk about in a minute, and spent fuel management. Further, signatories to the MOU at that time agree that such demonstration may include the implementation of SAFSTOR or other forms of delayed decommissioning. This is right out of the order that was issued in 2002.

Additionally the Board stated, and this is another quote of interest so I'll read the whole quote, critically the proposal before us now presents committed funds that are at least as significant as the available liquidity of companies such as Green Mountain and Central Vermont, and even more importantly are adequate when

measured against funds necessary to ensure safe maintenance and shut down of the plant in the event it ceases to produce power.

In other words, the financial assurances that Entergy has agreed to provide ENVY will be sufficient to ensure that ENVY has the resources it needs to operate and to eventually close and decommission Vermont Yankee. In addition, commitments and obligation from Entergy's parent corporation now back the most important commitments proposed for its proposed Vermont subsidiaries.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay, but one of the concerns that's come up is I understand that the Exenus spinoff corporation is in process.

MR. THAYER: Correct.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. When that spinoff happens Entergy is no longer the parent corp., the spinoff is, and it has no money and I think that's part of the concern.

MR. THAYER: Let me try to clarify that because this is a question we've talked about here before. The reason I started federal laws upfront is because there is no question in my mind anyway that the NRC issues the operating license and the operating license — to an owner, to an operator of the plant. That operating license is in force through the period of operation until

the NRC clears the site. When all the radiological material is removed. Okay. So they are in charge of that operating license.

They have through regulations, and I'll give you those regulations, they have reason to assure themselves that whoever holds that license is financially capable of executing either operating the plant, decommissioning the plant, or cleaning it up at the end.

Okay. So they know who is responsible. They go through a financial qualification review. They did this for Enexus last year to see if Enexus had the financial qualifications to act as a nuclear operating company operating multiple plants in this country, and they concluded that it did.

Now let me just boil it all down and be real simple about this. Okay. Under the scenario where we get to the end of operation for Vermont Yankee ENVY, and I know you've asked the question before, ENVY ceases operation, they don't have any more funds. ENVY has access to funds.

First, let's assume now we're in 2012 just to make it simple. ENVY would have access to funds from its parent assuming that the Enexus transaction goes through. Enexus Nuclear. Okay. That's a company that has been reviewed by the NRC. It's been reviewed by the FERC.

It's been reviewed by the SEC. All have concluded that that's a company that can perform the operation to operate multiple nuclear plants, get access to capital, get access to funds to be able to do this.

Now ENVY goes to Enexus Nuclear. If for some reason -- and I'll just take this through speculation -- Enexus Nuclear doesn't have those funds, it's clear in NRC regulation that the next place they go would be to Entergy. Okay. Now that's because Entergy was the previous holder of the license. Okay. So I just want to make sure that everybody knows that trail from ENVY to Enexus.

Now let's assume Enexus is not there.

What I just read you is Entergy is currently giving those parent guarantees, is currently giving those assurances.

NRC knows where the trail would lead if ENVY LLC doesn't have enough money. They know who backs that up and they know who assures that -- those license obligations. Today that's Entergy. Tomorrow it may be Enexus, but I can tell you NRC would not stop if Enexus didn't have the money. They would continue the trail back to the previous license holder which would be Entergy.

I've done some research on that with my company in the last few weeks. I didn't have a final answer on that when I talked to you the other day, but I

can be assured -- I'm sure about what I'm talking about today about how this trail would work and how NRC through its federal regulations would assure that there was a trail to make sure that there was adequate funding of decommissioning and spent fuel storage.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. So then asking for documents and parent guarantee shouldn't be a problem for us. I think that's been the issue in this. Given that somebody goes belly up in this process, you know, our concern, and I think the other one is the time span.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ THAYER: I'm going to talk about that in a minute.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. You know, how can we work a deal that allows us surety that if you don't get relicensed or if you do and something goes wrong and somebody goes belly up that, you know, we have some recourse that's a little better than having this lukewarm slightly hot box sitting on our shores for 60 years.

MR. THAYER: I think in summary, Madam
Chairman, with all due respect I think the point that I'm
trying to make is that the State of Vermont, Vermont
residents, Vermont ratepayers, Vermont consumers are
adequately covered by federal regulation when it comes to
the question of who is financially responsible for the
decommissioning of a nuclear plant sitting in the confines

of your state.

UNKNOWN MALE: This might help to understand the rationale for the reorganization as to what's the purpose of it other than protection of the parent.

MR. THAYER: It's some -- I didn't come fully prepared to talk about that today, but just very simply taking these five nuclear plants, actually six units, five nuclear sites, and putting them into a new company Enexus really has more to do with the nature of the company, the risk profile of the company, the attributes of that company from the standpoint of who wants to own that stock than it does protecting any entity from risk or isolating anybody from risk.

It really -- if you look at the way this company Entergy Nuclear grew up and now potentially Enexus Nuclear, it's very different than Entergy. Entergy is a collection of regulated utilities in the middle south fully vertically integrated utilities. In other words, from the generation source all the way to the customer's doorstep, whether that be a residential or commercial customer, regulated in the states that they operated in versus this nuclear organization that we've got and these assets that we purchased in the northeast and Michigan which are non-regulated, non-state regulated for the most

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part, and operate independent from fully integrated utilities and sell strictly into the wholesale electricity market.

That's a very different profile of a company from the conventional Entergy and, therefore, you get a very different -- you get a different risk profile, you get a different rating from rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's and Fitch, and, consequently, you get a different kind of a shareholder that wants to own that stock, and what we've been hearing over the last few years and one of the drivers for this separation was you've grown up into two very different companies. You should acknowledge that and split those companies apart so that you would be -- your identities would be more clear and that's not -- that's not a bad thing to do that. It's not a good thing to do. It's strictly a this is the profile of a company that started by buying one nuclear plant. All of a sudden there's six nuclear plants and it's almost as big as its parent.

So it's really a reality of what this business has done since we started it in 1999, where it is today, and then how that compares to a traditional rate regulated cost of service utility which is more like the companies that we operate in the rest of the mid south.

UNKNOWN MALE: I think last year we

asked for an organization chart.

MR. THAYER: Yes.

UNKNOWN MALE: And we got one that I thought was way oversimplified and had some work done and it was a lot more complicated than what we had seen.

MR. THAYER: Whatever way you slice it it's pretty complicated.

UNKNOWN MALE: No, I understand that, but I think the simplification probably didn't make clear some of the concerns we had.

MR. THAYER: Okay.

UNKNOWN MALE: Clarify one thing. Did you get an answer to your question about the parental guarantee?

UNKNOWN FEMALE: I did not.

MR. THAYER: I'm sorry.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Part of what we asked for last year in the bill that talked about, you know, before a spinoff and I believe part of what was in this bill is some form of guarantee that Entergy is still responsible at some level. There's still some recourse to Entergy if, you know, if something happens to either VY or Enexus, you know, that there is some parental guarantee, and just wondering if you don't have the answer today it would be helpful to get it why, you know, getting that

should be an issue if your statement is that Entergy understands that by federal regulation they are on the hook if all else fails.

MR. THAYER: So let me just repeat this so I understand clearly because I missed it the first time. I'm sorry.

What you're looking for is -- basically I've told you that federal regulations guarantee this. What you're looking for is will the parent state that in a form of a guarantee to --

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Or writing.

MR. THAYER: Or writing to the State of

Vermont?

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Yes.

MR. THAYER: I'm not prepared to answer that question this afternoon, but I think I understand it to the point now where I can answer it.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: I think that's what we asked for last year was some guarantee that when VY is owned by another firm which is highly leveraged it may or may not, depending on the markets and everything else, have the money to do the decommissioning, and I think — and I don't think anyone's disputing that at this point the fund, the fund is not adequate to decommission within anything less than 60 years is what I'm hearing.

MR. THAYER: No. That's not -- I'll get into that in a minute.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. Why don't we let you finish your statement and we can get there.

MR. THAYER: Okay. I guess the point I would like to make, going back to the quotes that I made from the Public Service Board order, the point I would like to leave you with is that when Entergy bought the plant in 2002 the idea of putting the plant into SAFSTOR for some period of time was thoroughly discussed with the parties involved in the process. Now you may not like that, but that is -- it's well documented. It's in the history. It's in the record and it's in the order.

We did not envision, I want to be plain here, we did not envision at any time during those discussions that we would use the full 60 years allowed by law in the SAFSTOR period. We still don't. We still don't.

If the plant were to close in 2012, the plant would remain in SAFSTOR for a period of time. Most likely, most likely in the 15 to 20-year time frame. Now we did some work with earnings on the fund, fund growth under realistic scenarios, fund growth under bad scenarios, and they all come out in a time frame in the 10 to 15 to 20-year period. They do not extend for 60 years. Okay.

Now I was -- I tried to make some charts on this. I was not successful. For that I apologize, but what I can tell you is that the bottom line answer is that it's -- it's fully reasonable to assume that under -- under market conditions that have prevailed over the last hundred years on average that those funds would produce a favorable result growing that decommissioning fund such that we would be able to take that plant apart in the 10 to 20-year period.

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Now to illustrate that unfortunately we're sitting here talking in a period of financial upheaval where we've seen the fund lose some 90 million dollars over the last 7 or 8 months. Now the month of March conversely was a very good month. Markets gained about 8 The decommissioning fund for Vermont Yankee gained back 12 million dollars. Okay. I can't make any predictions about April or May or any other month between now and 2012, but what I can tell you is that our financial analysis, financial analysis by our independent advisors say that this market that we've seen for the last seven months as far as earnings, especially earnings that are conservatively invested the way decommissioning funds are, is truly an abnormality and we should get back to fund growth in these types of investments in the 7 to 8 percent range because that historically, and there's an

index, there's a -- there's an indicator that people watch. I believe it goes back to 1927 and depending on the fund mix that you have, how conservative that is, how much in bonds, equities, government securities, this -- my number 7 or 8 percent would say that whether it's over the last 100 years, whether it's over the last 20 years, last 10 years it would bear that out. If you ask --

UNKNOWN MALE: (Inaudible) The inflationary cost of decommissioning over 20 year or 40 year?

MR. THAYER: Typically the decommissioning costs have inflated in the 3 to 3 and a half percent range.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: So how did you go from the sale in 2002 when the bulk of the discussion was around the surplus to being what it's estimated we need today? What -- I mean I assume these same markets were there and I'll go pre-October last year. What changed in those numbers that well we sold the plant in 2002, everyone said oh there's going to be an excess, you know, in 2012, who got the excess, and now we're in a deficit and what happened? I mean were the numbers wrong? Has there been a sudden inflation in -- what happened? Why were the numbers so off?

MR. THAYER: I think if you look at

recently as 2006, 2007 I would have probably sat here and told you there's going to be excess funds in the decommissioning fund because the earnings over that time were in that 6, 7, 8 percent range.

UNKNOWN MALE: If we're looking at being conservatively invested and you're talking 2, 3 percent as return the inflation for decommissioning, is 3 to 3 and a half percent, isn't that what you --

MR. THAYER: No. What I said was if you take -- let's say -- let's say the fund on average let's say it earned 7 percent and inflation takes away three and a half percent. So you've got 3 or 3 and a half percent real growth in the fund over that period, and if you compound that out over the next 10, 15, 20 years, you'll see that that fund comes right back to what is needed for decommissioning and greenfielding of the site.

Now we filed a lot of detailed information across the street with the Public Service Board on those cases on why we believe that to be true. Now that case is all around 2032, but I can tell you that all of our cases -- most of our cases for earnings between now and 2032 show that we'll be able to go right into decommissioning in 2032 because there will be adequate money in the fund even under a modest earning -- earnings scenarios. We've shown that in great detail.

I didn't want to complicate the case over here because we're talking over here 2012, but I just wanted to make that distinction that over the long term these funds will grow and will be adequate.

Now from a full disclosure standpoint, not to complicate the situation here, is one of the things that's been in question about, and I talked about this a minute ago, spent fuel storage, the cost of spent fuel storage, after the plant shuts down the cost to -- one of the things that you do is you put all the fuel that's in the pool into these dry storage containers and to get the plant -- get the fuel out of the plant. That's one of the first activities in the decommissioning. That takes the first five to seven years to do that because you've got to wait five years before you do -- before you can put the fuel -- the newest fuel into those containers. That costs anywhere between 200 and 250 million dollars.

Now the question previously has been is that

-- are we going to have to collect that much more in the

decommissioning fund, and what we've decided to do as this

court case that I described to you a minute ago, the cases

that we filed with the Public Service Board we have made a

decision that we're not going to collect that in the

decommissioning fund. We're going to take that as a -
we're going to collect that from the Department of Energy

because of this court case that I described to you before and the precedent for the Department of Energy paying those as damages in a breach of contract to Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee.

So rather than collect an additional 200 million dollars we're going to say well as we incur those costs we'll bill the Department of Energy and receive those funds back so that that's not another strain on the decommissioning fund.

I think some of the previous cases and some of the cases that were done by your consultants indicated that all that money had to be in there. That's why we got up to 900 million, a billion dollars for decommissioning and spent fuel storage and greenfielding because those costs were assumed to be a liability of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee when in fact the courts have decided those costs are a liability of the Department of Energy. That's —

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Has anyone gotten any money from the Department of Energy?

MR. THAYER: Yes, they have.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: They have. There was testimony here the other day, or maybe it was just editorializing, but no one has gotten anything.

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MR. THAYER: They have. Entergy Vermont

Yankee has not. We haven't made a claim yet, but we intend to make a claim because the court case was decided within the last year.

UNKNOWN MALE: Do we have a breakdown between what you're explaining is SAFSTOR dollars the Feds will owe us versus what the actual decommissioning would cost?

MR. THAYER: If you took the spent fuel costs out of that?

UNKNOWN MALE: Yeah, and I guess also would you be able to, so to speak, return everything to greenfield except for the dry casks?

MR. THAYER: That's -- that's always an assumption that the -- which will finish first, the decommissioning or the removal of the spent fuel, and I think that unfortunately we have several sites in New England today where the plant has been decommissioned, it's been cleaned up, the license has been released by the federal government, grass has been planted, and the fuel is still stored on the site. So that's -- that is one scenario. I can separate those costs out for you and get that to you.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Yeah. The other thing that might be helpful is the folks that have gotten money has that been dollar for dollar of the cost or has that

been a percentage negotiated?

MR. THAYER: No. It's been dollar by dollar. The claims are made based on the actual costs incurred. You can't make this claim until you've actually spent the money and then you have your actual receipts and invoices and you can prove to the Department of Energy this money was actually spent and they are reimbursing that money.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay.

UNKNOWN MALE: When did this taxpayer bailout for failure to remove fuel begin? When was it first started?

MR. THAYER: I'm sorry.

UNKNOWN MALE: The taxpayer bailout that you've just referred to --

MR. THAYER: Why do you refer to it as a taxpayer bailout?

UNKNOWN MALE: Because the NRC is paying for it.

MR. THAYER: The NRC is not paying for it. The Department of Energy -- in 1983 all the nuclear plants in the country started paying into a National Waste Fund. Okay. A tenth of a cent per kilowatthour, one mil per kilowatthour, one thousandths of a dollar per kilowatthour was collected by the old Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Corp. and has subsequently been collected by Entergy paid into the National Waste Fund as has every other plant for fuel, all the fuel that was used and all the fuel that will be used.

In exchange the Department of Energy contracted with each of those owners and said when you -- in 1998, no later than January 31, 1998 we will, in return for that payment, we will take your fuel. We will take possession of it. We will take title to it and we will take it away. That was the bargain under that contract. They failed to execute on that contract even though they kept the money and went to -- what the courts found is that you took the money from the companies you owe the company something for that. You haven't delivered on it so you're going to make them whole for their damages that they had to spend because you didn't come in 1998. Is that -- does that make sense now?

UNKNOWN MALE: It does which goes back to the taxpayer bailout question because that money was set aside for depository for nuclear fuel, and if you're successful in taking the money from the depository to be used instead to maintain storage of the fuel throughout the United States, then the fund that was going to build the nuclear depository is empty and sooner or later you got to send it somewhere, and it's -- we've been asked I

think very persuasively by Mr. Thayer to accept their funds that in 15 or 20 years SAFSTOR will be dealt with. If Entergy has faith in those numbers, and I assume that it is willing to give the state a guarantee that if what they have told us today does not come to pass, they Entergy will pack it up and not 15 or 20 years from now, I apologize for the miscalculation, and once again have you the taxpayers or ratepayers or someone else have to pick up the tab.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Is that a question?

UNKNOWN MALE: Yes. I eagerly await the guarantee, the estimates so passionately argued here today that they will come true that that bet is covered by the folks making the bet not the citizenry.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: I gather your concern is the money that was set aside was for nuclear depository, and I remember I thought it was 25 million dollars in that first meeting of Joint Fiscal that the State of Vermont paid in and it was part of ongoing payments. If we use up that fund paying for onsite storage, then there will never be offsite storage because there will be no money.

MR. THAYER: Actually the way I understand it, Madam Chair, and I can get some clarification on this, the money that's been paid into the

National Waste Fund is in excess of 25 billion dollars.

Now, unfortunately, and this is -- I'm not here to make an excuse for this, is that money has -- was not set aside.

That money was not parked in a fund. It was not off balance sheet by the federal government so that money has been spent. Okay.

Now Entergy and every other nuclear company in the United States continue to pay into that fund at the one mil per kilowatthour every year and I believe approximately 2 billion dollars is collected every year.

I can get a firm number on that.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay.

MR. THAYER: So there's money going in there. The State of Vermont in -- through what Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. paid and what Entergy has paid since 2002 has paid in just under 100 million dollars into that fund. Now the Department of Energy has to calculate interest on that 100 million dollars, and I think what you see, and I get -- I think Joint Fiscal Office I gave them these numbers, but I think total with interest the State of Vermont has paid in about 148 million dollars including interest. Okay. What I'm talking about recovering for the onsite storage is a small fraction of that. It's a small fraction of that, and I don't think under any scenario we would use the whole 148 million dollars.

Okay. So that's -- that's first of all.

Second of all, the 25 billion dollars does not sit with the federal government in a trust fund to be used for fuel storage. That's another problem. That's a big problem.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: There may not be money there.

MR. THAYER: We have -- well we have tried -- we have tried to pass legislation. The industry has pushed legislation to push the nuclear waste fund off balance sheet to make -- to put it into a fund so it would be there for the companies and the states to have some assurance that this would be there in the future. That has not been successful.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay.

MR. THAYER: Okay.

UNKNOWN MALE: When is the current decommissioning fund (inaudible.)

MR. THAYER: The federal law that was passed, I believe it was passed in 1983, and I think it required either in '83 or '84 for people to start collecting decommissioning funds and put them into a trust fund, and I'm not sure if the old Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. was collecting funds on their own before that, but that's when it became law. 25 years ago.

UNKNOWN MALE: 25 years ago.

UNKNOWN MALE: I'm trying to understand why I would expect 15 years from now this fund would be adequate (inaudible). If I understood correctly, we're saying that the math, the market predictions and so forth to fund this decommissioning fund adequately 15 to 20 years out decommission (inaudible) I'm trying to figure out how that would be given the 25-year history of this fund which is the condition it's in now which is grossly inadequate. What's so different about the next 15 years as opposed to the last 25?

MR. THAYER: Well, first of all, when we bought the plant in 2002 it was about 310 million dollars in the fund. That's what transferred over in the sale; 310, grew to 440, moved back to 370 or something. Okay. So the fund, as with any funds, the more you have in there, the more that's in the base fund the more small changes in interest rate growth influence that fund, and if you look at these models that I talked about that we submitted to the Public Service Board, you can see that once you get into the 3, 4, 500 million dollars range a small change in interest makes that fund grow fairly rapidly, and I think between 199 -- 1983 and 2002 the companies were contributing such that there wasn't -- in the early years there wasn't very much money in there. So

if you don't have much money in there you don't get much benefit from interest groups, but in the later years when there was a lot of money in there you're very sensitive to the interest group. That's the -- I'm not a financial person, but that's my basic understanding.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay.

UNKNOWN MALE: I have not a doubt in the world that as long as you have control over this you'll make (inaudible) okay, but we're going beyond yours and my lifetimes, and I think earlier we did a bill, this is an analogy, we did a bill dealing with tenants and landlords, and I was reminded about the time about 40 years ago living a daring bohemian life, I went to my landlord who was the kind of guy you would see on the Sopranos and I explained two things. I explained why it wasn't my fault that I didn't have the rent, and, secondly, I explained my plan by which I would have the rent in about three weeks, and what he said to me was, Rich, you can only pay your rent with money. You cannot pay your rent with a speech.

Okay. With all due respect I have perfect confidence in you. You're not going to be here. You're going to be, if you're lucky, living in Florida, but probably not on this planet when the bill comes due, and so good explanation why it's not your company's fault, good explanation of the plan, but as my landlord said

money talks, and I'll spare you the rest of that expression.

MR. THAYER: I guess with all due respect, Senator, one of the reasons that I started out the way I did was to let you know that this isn't Jay Thayer's promise. This isn't anybody sitting in this room's promise to the State of Vermont. This is grounded in federal law. It's grounded in Public Service Board orders. It's grounded in legal documents, and all I'm doing is interpreting or reading to you from those documents so you can see what exists that codified into laws and orders and things that we operate by already without the benefit of this bill, and that's what I tried to leave you with. It's not — it's not my, you know, interpretation of what's on paper. It's what exists.

UNKNOWN MALE: I think 25 years ago most people determined federal law guarantees that money would be in there now and it's not.

UNKNOWN MALE: That's right.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. I want to let Mr. Thayer finish his testimony. Then -- I think we've kind of broken his chain of thought.

MR. THAYER: I can wrap up.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay.

MR. THAYER: I guess we talked a lot

about the current House bill. It is Entergy's position, I'll say it again, this bill would violate the terms of the Certificate of Public Good for the sale of Vermont Yankee issued by the Public Service Board in 2002.

I have to also tell you that that CPG carefully weighed the benefits to Entergy, to the Vermont utilities, to the Vermont ratepayers, and struck a balance between low electricity rates to Vermont consumers for 10 years, 2002 to 2012, and the need to contribute money to the decommissioning fund versus letting it grow through interest and earnings.

A new requirement for ENVY to contribute over 229 million dollars to the fund prior to 2012 is clearly in violation of the terms of the Public Service Board order under which we operate here in Vermont. As I mentioned before when I testified in front of the Committee, the company will have no other choice than to seek a legal remedy if this bill were to pass. I don't want this to sound like a threat because it is not, but Vermont Yankee does not make the type of revenue that would allow it to pay this type of payment and, therefore, we would not agree to such terms.

In our view this bill could well force Entergy VY to close the plant before its current license expires in 2012.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: If we can find a different payment schedule is that -- just you don't have to answer, but just is the number the problem or the fact that the payment at all, and, you know, I know you may not have --

MR. THAYER: The simple answer is the fact that a payment is being required at this point in the contract with Vermont Yankee is what we object to. Now I've said this many times before and I think you heard this from Attorney Hofmann. We're across the street talking about what's next for Vermont Yankee. I know you people will ultimately deliberate what's next for Vermont Yankee, and what I'm here to tell you there's a lot of energy going into the tiered 2012 to 2032 how is decommissioning going to be handled, what assurances are going to be given, how is that going to be backed up so that we'll know when 2032 comes from Vermont Yankee will be rapidly decommissioned and the site returned to a greenfield.

There's a lot of energy going into that process to investigate, explore, provide testimony, rebuttal testimony. There will eventually be live hearings on that across the street at which time all the parties will be allowed to cross examine and explore each other's ideas, and I just that is — that is when this

type of an answer, which has such a significant impact on the company, needs to be answered.

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UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay.

UNKNOWN MALE: That's where we were 20 years ago, Madam Chair. That was all debated. It was all discussed. Guarantees were made. Promises and assurances were given. The federal government was there to back them The fund was established, and here we are today and it has not come to pass and they are saying I'm going to start all over again from scratch and there are two issues we have. One that's before us and the other is the waste that has been generated and will be generated up until 2012 has been handled in a way that no one expected and contrary to the promises that were given, and this Legislature is going to have to make a decision whether it's going to give permission to start a whole new pile of waste that hasn't been started yet based on assurances and promises by the same people that made those assurances and promises 20 years ago that haven't come to pass.

MR. THAYER: I know that the Department of Public Service provided some testimony last week indicating the potential impact to ratepayers if an early closure of Vermont Yankee were to happen so I don't want to go into that.

One thing I don't believe the Department

mentioned was the Clean Energy Development Fund.

Currently we contribute approximately 3 to 4 million

dollars a year to that fund from the revenues received -
we receive from power, uprate power. If we were to be

forced to close early, that would significantly reduce

future contributions that would be available to fund

projects from that fund.

Additionally, the immediate impact, economic impact, of an early plant closure cannot be overlooked. The 55 million dollar payroll would be drastically reduced in the first year, as well as reductions in local and state taxes and goods and services purchased in that area. There have been several detailed economic studies performed on this by Entergy, by others, and by the Department, and all the -- all those studies have been large and pretty much point to the same consequence.

In summary, under federal law NRC regulates decommissioning issues including financial assurances and adequacy of decommissioning funds to accomplish complete plant decommissioning, including storage of spent nuclear fuel. Entergy is meeting all of its federal regulatory requirements today. We have been, we continue to, and we intend to in the future.

We're also committed and bound by federal law to ensure that the Vermont Yankee plant is safely

maintained and monitored after its shut down until radiological decommissioning is completed. Entergy Vermont Yankee is also committed to returning Vermont Yankee plant site to a greenfield, a condition following radiological decommissioning and termination of the NRC license. That's unique. That's not required by federal law, but I want to make sure I say that because it is a commitment we have made in Vermont and that is memorialized in the Public Service Board order in 2002 for that greenfield or technical term site restoration.

ensuring that the funding of these activities is assured without impact on the ratepayers or the taxpayers of the State of Vermont. Entergy Vermont Yankee entered into an agreement with the State of Vermont when it purchased the plant in 2002 in which it assumed all the risk of operation and decommissioning while the Vermont utilities recovered all their sunk costs in the purchase price, as well as received a below market PPA saving Vermont ratepayers to date 324 million dollars. Entergy has lived up to its part of the agreement and would expect the state to live up to its end of the agreement as well.

Entergy Vermont Yankee would also like to operate the station for an additional 20 years continuing to supply Vermont and the region with safe, reliable,

economical base load power, and we have taken action with the Legislature and with the Public Service Board to achieve that objective. If the plant is licensed to operate until 2032, the plant will be decommissioned immediately which could end up being sooner than if the plant were to be closed in 2012.

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That concludes my -- my formal prepared remarks. I would like to make one -- one correction to a discussion, that exchange with Senator MacDonald.

We were -- I think a minute ago we were confusing the decommissioning responsibility and the decommissioning funding with the spent fuel responsibility and the spent fuel fund and the National Waste Fund. I was -- okay, maybe I was the one being confused, but the National Waste Fund at one point it was said, I think I said this, it was that the claims that are being made currently to pay off the fact that the government has not delivered on its contract. Those claims are not coming out of the National Waste Fund. Those claims are coming out of a damage fund -- damages fund which the government handles its damage claims separately from the original fund. So that original fund is not being used to pay those damages. That's just the way the federal government I was reminded by Mr. Dave McElwee who sits operates. with me in the room today that that's -- and I believe

it's called the damages fund. There's a technical term for it, but it's not the National Waste Fund. So the National Waste Fund remains. Money is paid in by Vermont remains, and if damages are claimed by Entergy that will not come out of the waste fund.

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UNKNOWN MALE: Federal fund. Thank you very much.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay.

UNKNOWN MALE: I would like to commend you for your forthright presentation. I would like to second Senator MacCormick's question to you, but I'm wondering if you haven't come bearing a burden bigger than you can carry to satisfy this table. You are part of the situation. I keep looking for somebody to come in from over there on a silver horse and back you up. I think in this room there are more people wanting to refute maybe what you say than -- than back up what you want to say and nobody is here telling me a very important thing and that is how detrimental passing this bill will be, and you're part of a company. Somebody from the industry has been through this problem before except for the uniqueness of Vermont where the Legislature has stepped in to the process. Nobody's waving their finger at us the way I would feel more comfortable. Madam Chair.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Yes.

Attachment 3 Thayer Testimony

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UNKNOWN MALE: Am I making any sense? 1 2 UNKNOWN MALE: Yes. 3 UNKNOWN MALE: I've sat here listening very carefully and that's what I think. 4 5 UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. UNKNOWN MALE: Is there -- there an 6 7 answer? 8 UNKNOWN FEMALE: I would ask Mr. Thayer. 9 UNKNOWN MALE: Is there somebody else 10 who could come in from another nuclear plant that's been 11 through the same kind of process that you have and -- and 12 would look at us and point out how devastating to our 13 economy or whatever passage of the decommissioning bill would be? 14 15 MR. THAYER: I guess I'm not sure how to 16 answer that question, and I think one of the things that 17 we try to do in assembling this testimony was give you the 18 facts, and one of the reasons I said before is I started 19 with the federal government and then I went very specific 20 to Vermont. That's one of things about somebody else from 21 another company coming in here telling you how 22 decommissioning is done in Illinois or Louisiana. It's 23 not Vermont. The Public Service Board has placed some 24 restrictions, some conditions in their orders that are

unique to Vermont. So I wanted to talk about a Vermont

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case as opposed to a generic case.

UNKNOWN MALE: I'm not criticizing anything.

MR. THAYER: I'm just trying to tell you why I've kind of zeroed in on the Vermont specific case because there are some unique features to the Vermont case that I wanted to talk to you about and the assurances that you have both at the federal level and at the state level that have been well documented that are unique in the nuclear industry.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: I think your testimony has been that you oppose the bill primarily because it is an alternative to an existing contract and the added cost could force closure before 2012, and that you feel that if something happened either before 2012 when, you know, another cycle will start, another set of negotiations could start, that there is adequate federal oversight and funding to cover decommissioning in a reasonable amount of time, something closer to 20 than 60 years, and that one other thing, and that in the event of a spinoff company that eventually Entergy would have corrected its responsibility if all else failed?

UNKNOWN MALE: I mean you led me right into this question. What would happen if the NRC -- have a yes or no -- if Entergy was to sell off the spinoff at

some point to another company? 1 2 MR. THAYER: Absolutely because in those 3 cases the license transfers -- right now Entergy company holds the license for Vermont Yankee. Entergy Nuclear 4 5 Vermont Yankee and Entergy Nuclear Operations hold that license. In order to change that you have to make 6 7 application to the NRC, you have to show them your financial qualifications, you have to prove to them that 8 9 you're qualified to do this. 10 UNKNOWN MALE: Who owns the license? 11 MR. THAYER: Today? 12 UNKNOWN MALE: Well in the new 13 structure. 14 MR. THAYER: Enexus Nuclear and Entergy 15 or Enexus Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC. The two can still 16 be jointly held. 17 UNKNOWN MALE: But where is Entergy the 18 parent in this? MR. THAYER: Not in as a license holder. 19 20 UNKNOWN MALE: So if Entergy decided to 21 sell its share in the two --22 MR. THAYER: They wouldn't have a share 23 in the two. If -- if the transaction were completed --UNKNOWN MALE: And if the transaction's 24

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completed and they have no share in the two, then isn't

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part of the transaction a fairly heavily leveraged Yankee and better balance sheet on Entergy?

you mean?

MR. THAYER: That's a complicated question and I don't feel adequately qualified to answer it, but what I can tell you is that it has been looked at. This transfer has been looked at. I know it's been described as a heavily leveraged transaction. I don't believe that it is. I believe that there's -- there's six nuclear units. There's five nuclear sites involved in this. These are high performing assets. Most of them have long term power contracts so they are very secure assets from the standpoint of financial risk. So -- UNKNOWN MALE: If they keep performing

MR. THAYER: Yeah, and I think, you know, we have had -- these units are not spotty performers.

UNKNOWN MALE: This is not a -- this is more of a, you know, if something happens so -- and not necessarily in Vermont, one of them's not relicensed then all of a sudden you've got that whole new company underwater fairly significantly.

MR. THAYER: It's actually not because it's, as I said, it's spread over six units, five sites, and it's the -- when you look at the power contracts, the

cash flows, the access to capital of this new entity, we go through scenarios and we look at what if one of those plants were to shut down. What if it were to shut down for six months? What if it were to shut down for two years? And we do those scenarios to prove to ourselves — to prove to ourselves we can still meet our obligations, make our payments and not be financially threatened.

UNKNOWN MALE: You could lose 20 percent

UNKNOWN MALE: You could lose 20 percent of your revenue.

MR. THAYER: We go through loss of plant, we go through power markets decline, some level, we don't get as much money for our power, we go through scenario planning to make sure that we can meet the obligations of this new company, and as -- I would argue with you on heavily leveraged, but I can tell you that the company is very -- will be -- is very sound financially to be able to meet its obligations to be able to take care of contingencies like shutdowns, and without bankrupting the company and I think --

UNKNOWN MALE: You're essentially talking if it was one plant down you would lose 20 percent of your revenues.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ THAYER: No because -- well depends on which plant because these are different.

UNKNOWN MALE: Just approximately.

MR. THAYER: Approximately, sure.

UNKNOWN MALE: And that seems for a

prolonged period of time or permanently like that pretty much neutralizes any value on the company.

MR. THAYER: I can't give you a quantitative answer to that, but I can tell you that that would not bankrupt the company.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Senator Hartwell.

about testimony about the 15 years (inaudible) analysis that have been done of the decommissioning fund which is properly funded, I would assume from that -- that even if this bill -- the first two payments came immediately after the March 21, 2012 would you still have a problem with the bill? (inaudible).

MR. THAYER: Yes because I think -- I think the bill carves out a very critical, very important question. I'm not arguing the importance of the issue, but what I'm saying it's probably premature because of the activity and energy that's going into answering this question across the street at the Public Service Board in which a lot of parties participate, a lot of analysis is on the table and being poked at. I would say to just come up with, you know, two payments on a payment stream that makes people feel better about the money and

decommissioning is out of process. It's an arbitrary and random answer.

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UNKNOWN MALE: (inaudible) what's going on across the street what's going on in here.

MR. THAYER: With all due respect, Senator, I would just say I would make the distinction between that in that what's going on across the street is we have filed thousands of pages of testimony on the license, the continued operations case, and that testimony it is allowed to be discovery performed, it's allowed to be rebutted by all the parties. As I said, this is all done under oath and we'll eventually have live hearings where people can be cross examined, and I would just submit to you, and not in disrespect for this process, that is a better way to answer such a difficult and lasting question as a company paying hundreds of millions of dollars into a fund to solve a problem that may not be problem, and I would just submit to you -- I would just respectfully submit that the investigation process by the Public Service Board, as I described was used during the sale, is in my mind a very thorough, high integrity process that gives a huge amount of protection to the State of Vermont.

UNKNOWN MALE: Yes, we still seem to circle back to a parental guarantee that is right there in

front of everybody, and we've also been dealing with more complexity than I can fathom scientifically and everything else, and in the end to me it's real simple. It's coming down to trust, and like Senator MacDonald said, you know, we trust each other there's no problem. I have all the faith in the world in you. I worry a little bit about New Orleans. How do we — the impasse I see is a simple guarantee would cross all those bridges and probably make it — a lot of headway. I think a lot of us get real suspicious the more complex you get in this day and age.

MR. THAYER: I agree.

UNKNOWN MALE: And the more entities that are involved and not that I don't have faith in the Public Service Board or faith in the utilities. It's just we keep digging this hole so deep and so complex that we need to keep -- back up and solve the trust issue which seems to be something as simple as a guarantee.

MR. THAYER: I took that as a question which I'm going to act on from the Chair quite a few minutes ago now and I will -- I will provide an answer to this Committee.

UNKNOWN FEMALE: Okay. I think that would be helpful. Any other questions? Okay. Thank you.

MR. THAYER: Thank you very much.

(End of discussion.)